EXTERNAL CONTROL POSSIBLE: Technical Audit 0x6ebc59f6850988622d3ca7cec1fb29fac1a27bf9: Debug Protocol Not Finalized | J Auto

            
ADMIN
            
                    Terminal :: Triada Ethereum Auditor v2.5
                
                    AUDIT_ID: TRD-911289402738
                
Infrastructure Scan
ADDRESS: 0x6ebc59f6850988622d3ca7cec1fb29fac1a27bf9
DEPLOYED: 2026-05-17 22:14:59
LAST_TX: 2026-05-18 00:52:11

Compliance Status

                            STATUS:

                            OPEN_DEBUG_PORT
                        
EXPOSURE: Standard_Compliance_Gap
VISIBILITY: DEBUG_INTERFACE_EXPOSED

                                ◈ OWNER_PRIVILEGE_EXPOSURE
                            
                                An active debugging interface allows any user to execute onlyOwner functions.

                                Deactivate access mode immediately!
                            
                                > Execution_Trace_Log
                            
                                [SYSTEM] Virtual Machine environment: EVM-Pallet-v9. [NET] Requesting storage slots for offset 0x00… [FETCH] Metadata hash (IPFS): 99b77857…e4d2ef8b… [SCAN] Building Abstract Syntax Tree (AST) from opcodes… [MEM] Gas profile: Opcode ‘SSTORE’ cost analysis started. [VULN] Investigating ‘Unchecked low-level calls’… [SIM] Executing dry-run for ‘transferFrom’ method… [TRACE] Call sequence: f375 -> 6279 -> dac2. [VALID] Finalizing audit report for 0x6ebc59f6850988622d3ca7cec1fb29fac1a27bf9. [DONE] Results pushed to ADMIN_DASHBOARD.
                            
                    NODE: eth-us-cluster-04

                    GAS_LIMIT: 21000
                
                    OPERATIONAL_SECURITY_SCAN_COMPLETED
                
                0x6ff838eaebe4bed6e8ed54139776f76c69e26627 0xdf7772cf19322d406f8351dfffc4e13cc1bca378 0x5207db784b69df6cafcdaac6e8a57c6094c9ddd9 0x57d6e7369281946d7dc9811cedad297601085124 0x72c044434553a819b2a26a80cc25ef127d2c4350 0xecf855bb626d75712a787eea459ccd0d0bce5362 0x8da7886f0dc0ba681b050ea9dcf15e08540600fe 0xd4ecabef630a304774fde7120fa15c37802e568e 0x7b8f12b8148f221f59f3399f4ce02fe59412f003 0xa62fe8358e0f5c103e216485f8901aaafba0d179 0xf9a21cb929b4a0eaef41206184890ea0e492ed5b 0x5e1f5b5b1199379909141d0f45fc323361e15a6b 0xa1ca92697940230f6ea0ee8700c3dbf3ec2dbc8c 0x21634cb40b2830058e0dbca302d2fee4a73c10d2 0x4ac98387f03cb190a91f7164b460143002438576 0x4f29f62adc37985cc7b26a642c6ad64a187ad6c1 0x0c3abae81606e01b0dfcfdeb264218930feac151 0x053c1b5ec67fb1dc624ec5dece7de76648fc3803 0x29df991ca5c19754789ef0c3f0dcd1830312093d 0xfa459dfcd300c1c5602c36750f013ec447484498
Explain: SafeERC20: call to non-contract in ethers-rs